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Abstract
The consideration of nonstandard models of the real numbers and
the definition of a qualitative ordering on those models provides a
generalization of the principle of maximization of expected utility. It
enables the decider to assign probabilities of different orders of mag-
nitude to different events or to assign utilities of different orders of
magnitude to different outcomes. The properties of this generalized
notion of rationality are studied in the frameworks proposed by von
Neumann and Morgenstern and later by Anscombe and Aumann. It is
characterized by an original weakening of their postulates in two dif-
ferent situations: nonstandard probabilities and standard utilities on
one hand and standard probabilities and nonstandard utilities on the
other hand. This weakening concerns both Independence and Conti-
nuity. It is orthogonal with the weakening proposed by lexicographic
orderings.
∗This work was partially supported by the Jean and Helene Alfassa fund for research
in Artificial Intelligence and by grant 136/94-1 of the Israel Science Foundation on “New
Perspectives on Nonmonotonic Reasoning”.
1
1 Infinitesimal probabilities
Suppose you are considering playing dice. You have to choose between bet-
ting on six (b6) and betting on four (b4). The sums won are the same. You
experiment with the dice and come to the conclusion that the chances of the
dice falling on six are equal to those it falls on four. You conclude that you
are indifferent between b6 and b4. You are now offered a third bet (e6): you
win if the dice falls on six or falls on one of the (twelve) edges. You ponder
the chances of the dice falling on an edge and conclude that they are too
small to make you prefer the bet e6 to b4. You are indifferent between b4
and e6. Since you believe in the transitivity of indifference, you conclude you
are indifferent between e6 and b6.
You now consider two more bets. In e, you win a large sum if the dice falls
on any one of the edges. In f, you win the same sum if the dice falls on the
edge that lies between face six and face five. You decide you prefer bet e to
bet f.
According to the theory of rationality proposed by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern [19], you are irrational. If you are indifferent between e6 and b6,
it must be that you give subjective probability zero to the event of the dice
falling on one of its edges. In this case, you must be indifferent between e and
f. You may certainly be rational and indifferent between e and f, but must
any rational decider be such? This work suggests the preferences above can
be explained by choosing some number ǫ, positive but infinitesimally close to
zero (as in Robinson’s [15]), and assigning a subjective probability of 1−ǫ
6
to
the dice falling on any of its faces and a probability of ǫ
12
to the dice falling
on any one of its edges. The numbers 1−ǫ
6
and 1−ǫ
6
+ ǫ are qualitatively (the
term will be formally defined below) equivalent. The numbers ǫ and ǫ
6
are
not qualitatively equivalent.
2 Infinitesimal utilities
Here is a different example. Suppose you have to choose between two lotter-
ies. In the first lottery you may win, with probability p, a week’s vacation
in Hawaii. With probability 1 − p you get nothing. In the second lottery
you may win, with the same probability p, the same vacation in Hawaii,
but, with probability 1 − p you get a consolation prize: a free copy of your
favorite magazine. Since the free copy is preferred to nothing, von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s independence postulate implies that lottery two is preferred
to lottery one. But couldn’t a rational decision maker be indifferent between
the two lotteries? One, often, I think, buys a lottery ticket in a frame of mind
focused on the big prize and not on the consolation prize. This behavior is
by no means general, as attested by the fact lotteries often offer consolation
prizes, but should a decision maker indifferent between the two lotteries be
considered irrational in all situations? I think not.
A variation on this example considers also a third lottery, in which one
wins a trip to Paris with the same probability p as above, and nothing with
probability 1 − p. Suppose you try to compare lotteries one and three. You
ponder at length the advantages and disadvantages of the two vacation spots,
and decide you are indifferent between the trip to Hawaii and the trip to Paris,
all relevant considerations taken into account. You conclude that you are also
indifferent between the lotteries one and three. The Independence axiom of
von Neumann and Morgenstern implies that lottery two is preferred to lottery
three. But it has been argued that it is quite unreasonable to expect the very
slight improvement that lottery two presents over lottery one to overcome the
lengthy and delicate deliberation that made you conclude that the trips to
Hawaii and Paris are equivalent for you.
Similar examples have been put forward to argue that the indifference rela-
tion is not always transitive: lottery three is equivalent to lottery one and to
lottery two, but lottery two is preferred to lottery one. The system presented
in this paper endorses the transitivity of indifference, but allows a decision
maker to be indifferent between lotteries one and two.
This work proposes to consider that the utility you attach to the trips to
Paris and Hawaii are equal, say 1. The utility you attach to the free copy
of your favorite magazine is ǫ, some positive number, infinitesimally close to
zero. The utility of lottery one and of lottery three is p, that of lottery two
is p+ (1− p)ǫ, which is qualitatively equivalent to p. Nevertheless, the free
copy of the magazine has utility ǫ, that is not qualitatively equivalent to zero.
3 Infinite utilities
Let us consider yet another situation. A patient has to choose between two
options:
1. (option p) do nothing and die in a matter of weeks,
2. (option q) undergo surgery, the result of which, depending on some
objective probabilities, may be a long and happy life (denoted by l) or
an immediate death on the operation table (denoted by d). We shall
denote by λ the probability of the surgery being successful, i.e., the
probability of l. The probability of death on the operation table is,
therefore, 1− λ.
In other terms, one has to compare mixtures p and λ l + (1− λ) d. Assuming
one prefers l to p and prefers p to d, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s postu-
lates imply what we shall call property P: there is a unique λ ∈]0, 1[ for which
one is indifferent between p and λ l + (1− λ) d. For any µ > λ, one prefers
µ l + (1− µ) d to p, and for all µ < λ, one prefers p to µ l + (1− µ) d. If one
thinks that a long and happy life is overwhelmingly preferable to p so as to
make the distinction between p and d insignificant, i.e., that µ l + (1− µ) d
is preferable to p for any µ ∈]0, 1[, property P fails and one deviates from
von Neumann-Morgenstern’s rationality postulates.
But would we really dismiss as irrational such a behavior, or such a pref-
erence? The consideration of an infinite utility for l explains the preference.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern’s point of view is perfectly acceptable and I have
no criticism for someone who adheres to it and decides there is indeed some
µ, very close to zero, perhaps, such that p is equivalent to µ l + (1− µ) d.
My only claim is that someone who thinks µ l + (1− µ) d is preferable to p
for any µ ∈]0, 1[ cannot be considered irrational outright.
An argument, very similar to the one just presented, for prefering a mixture
µw + (1− µ)d to some p, for any µ ∈]0, 1[, even though p is preferred to d,
appears in Pascal’s [14]. There w denotes eternal bliss (the reward of the
believer if God exists), d denotes a life spent in error by a believer in a
God that does not exist, and p denotes a life spent by a non-believer. This
argument, known as Pascal’s wager, is very well-known and the reader may
find in a detailed discussion in [13].
A number of papers [5, 18, 2] discussed, in the setting of the St. Petersburg’s
paradox, the existence of unbounded utilities. In the last of these papers,
Aumann argues very convincingly that utilities should be bounded. At first
sight, one may think that infinite utilities imply unbounded utilities, and
therefore Aumann argues also against infinite utilities, but this is not the
case. His argument may be summarized in the following way: if utilities
were unbounded, for any λ ∈]0, 1[ there would be a consequence (c) such
that a lottery λ c+ (1− λ) d is prefered to a long and happy life (l). But
this seems very unreasonable to Aumann. His argument is directed against
unbounded utilities, but ineffective against infinite utilities. Certainly, no
consequence is infinitely preferable to l and therefore, if there are infinite
utilities, the utility of l is infinite. But there is absolutely no problem if one
assumes that the utility of l is infinite and maybe even maximal (nothing is
prefered to l). In this case, Aumann’s argument disappears. The fact that l
is infinitely prefered to some other consequence, d for example, or a sum of
money, will influence the preferences of a decider between lotteries involving
l and consequences such as d.
4 Background
Utility theory is discussed in the framework of [19, Chapter 3], see also [7].
Let H be a boolean algebra of subsets of X , and P a convex set of probability
measures on H.We assume that P is finitely generated. Convex means here
that:
∀p, q ∈ P, ∀λ ∈]0, 1[, λp+ (1− λ)q ∈ P.
Here ]0, 1[ denotes the open real interval in some model, maybe nonstandard,
of the real numbers.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern have characterized the binary relations >
on P that can be defined by a linear functional u on P , when ]0, 1[ is the
standard interval, in the following way:
∀p, q ∈ P, p > q ⇔ u(p) > u(q). (1)
In Equation 1, the functional u is a function from P to the standard set of
real numbers R and the relation > in the right hand side is the usual strict
ordering on R.
Their characterization is equivalent to the following, due to Jensen [8]
(see [7, p. 1408]) three conditions, for all p, q, r ∈ P and all λ ∈]0, 1[ (a
weak order is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation):
A1 > on P is a weak order,
A2 p > q ⇒ λp+ (1− λ)r > λq + (1− λ)r,
A3 (p > q, q > r) ⇒ ∃α, β ∈]0, 1[, such that
αp+ (1− α)r > q > βp+ (1− β)r.
The three conditions above are not the original postulates of von Neumann
and Morgenstern, they are equivalent to them. They will be referred to, nev-
ertheless, in this work, as von Neumann and Morgenstern’s postulates. The
purpose of this work is to generalize von Neumann and Morgenstern’s char-
acterization to deal with qualitative probabilities or with qualitative utilities.
In the sequel, p ≥ q will denote q 6> p and p ∼ q will denote the conjunction
of p ≥ q and q ≥ p.
5 Qualitative Decision Theory
Qualitative decision theory has been developed mostly in opposition to quan-
titative decision theory, stressing decision methods that do not satisfy von
Neumann-Morgenstern’s or Savage’s [16] postulates, the postulates generally
accepted for quantitative decision theory. The focus in qualitative decision
theory has always been on methods and algorithms, more than on an ax-
iomatic treatment ([4] is an exception).
A different approach is proposed here: qualitative and quantitative deci-
sion theories can be viewed as special cases of a unified general theory of
decision that contains both. This unified theory is a generalization of the
quantitative theory. The power of the generalization lies in the consideration
of nonstandard models of the set of real numbers for utilities and a definition
of indifference that neglects infinitesimally small differences. In this paper
probabilities will always be standard. Some first results, for nonstandard
probabilities and standard utilities have been presented in [11]. Preliminary
ideas appeared in [12].
A well-established tradition in Decision Theory considers Expected Utility
Maximization as the only rational policy. Following this view, an act f is
strictly preferred to an act g iff the utility expected from f is strictly larger
than that expected for g. Since expected utilities are real numbers, strictly
larger has its usual, quantitative meaning. The main claim of this paper is
that the qualitative point of view may be subsumed by a slightly different
definition of strictly larger. Suppose we consider any model elementarily
equivalent to the real numbers, more precisely, any (standard or nonstandard)
model of the real numbers, R (for the standard model, we shall use R). Let
x and y be elements ofR. To make matters simpler, suppose that both x and
y are positive. The number x is quantitatively larger than y iff x− y > 0.
What could be a reasonable definition of qualitatively larger? Clearly, if
x is qualitatively larger than y then it must be quantitatively larger: in
a sense qualitatively larger means definitely larger. A first idea that may
be considered is to use a notion that proved fundamental for nonstandard
analysis (the monads of [15], or see [10]): the notion of two numbers being
infinitely close, and consider that a number x is qualitatively larger than a
number y iff x is larger than y and not infinitely close to y, i.e., iff x− y is
strictly larger than some positive standard number. At first this idea looks
appealing: if ǫ is strictly positive and infinitesimally close to zero, and x is
a standard, strictly positive, real, we do not want x+ ǫ to be qualitatively
larger than x. At a second look, one realizes that the size of x− y should not
be judged absolutely, but relatively to the size of x: for example ǫ2 + ǫ should
be qualitatively larger than ǫ2. Therefore I propose the following definition:
Definition 1 Let x and y be positive. We shall say that x is qualitatively
larger than y and write x ≻ y iff x−y
x
is strictly positive and not infinitesimally
close to zero: in other terms, iff there is a strictly positive standard number
r such that x−y
x
≥ r.
The definition may be extended to arbitrary numbers in an obvious way:
1. if x ≥ 0 and 0 > y, then x ≻ y, and
2. x ≻ y iff −y ≻ −x,
x  y shall denote x 6≻ y and x ∼ y shall denote that x  y and y  x.
Notice that, if we choose, for R, the standard model of the reals, R, then
x ≻ y iff x > y. Therefore our treatment would include the classical ap-
proach, if we allowed also negative utilities. As said above, in this paper,
we concentrate on the case all utilities are positive. Is our framework, with
positive nonstandard utilities, a generalization of the classical theory, with
standard positive and negative utilities? Since, in the classical setting, utili-
ties are defined only up to an additive constant, bounded utilities may always
be considered to be positive, by adding a positive large enough constant. In
view of Aumann’s [2] critique of unbounded utilities, we feel that the present
framework encompasses the most important part of classical theory.
Notice also that Definition 1 relies on the notion of a nonstandard number,
and that notion is not first-order definable.
Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization, the paradigm of rationality
proposed here is the version of Expected Utility Maximization that obtains
when, for probabilities and utilities,
• the models chosen for the real numbers may be nonstandard, and
• real numbers are compared qualitatively, i.e., by ≻.
At this stage, I do not know of an axiomatic characterization of Expected
Qualitative Utility Maximization in its most general form: nonstandard prob-
abilities and utilities. But two orthogonal special cases have been character-
ized in full: first, the case in which probabilities may be nonstandard but util-
ities are standard and secondly, the case in which probabilities are standard
but utilities may be nonstandard. In the first case, we want to characterize
the binary relations > on P that can be defined by a functional u : P → R
into the standard real numbers in the following way:
∀p, q ∈ P, p > q ⇔ u(p) > u(q), (2)
and u is pseudo-linear, i.e.:
∀p, q ∈ P, ∀λ ∈]0, 1[, u(λp+ (1− λ)q) ∼ λu(p) + (1− λ)u(q). (3)
In Equation 3, the interval ]0, 1[ may be non-standard and therefore the
right-hand side of the equivalence may be nonstandard. This case is treated
in Section 7.
In the second case, we characterize the binary relations > on P that can
be defined by a linear functional u : P → R+ in the following way:
∀p, q ∈ P, p > q ⇔ u(p) ≻ u(q). (4)
Here the interval ]0, 1[ is the standard one. This case in treated in Section 8.
One should immediately notice that, if c > 0, the utility function c u(p)
defines the same ordering as u(p), and is linear or pseudo-linear iff u is.
But, contrary to what happens in the classical setting, if d ∈ R the func-
tion d+ u(x) does not, in general, define the same ordering as u(p). Such
an instability under an additive constant, and in particular an asymmetry
between gains and losses has been found in the behavior of decision makers
in many instances [6, 9, 17]. The question of whether Expected Qualitative
Utility Maximization is a realistic model for explaining such behavior cannot
be discussed in this work.
6 Maximin as Expected Qualitative Utility
Maximization
Considering nonstandard utilities enables us to obtain decision criteria that
do not satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern’s postulates and were so far con-
sidered as part of the realm of qualitative decision theory.
As noticed above, Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization generalizes
Expected Utility Maximization: if one chooses the standard model for real
numbers then Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization boils down exactly
to Expected Utility Maximization, at least when utilities are bounded. We
shall show now that considering nonstandard utilities enables us to obtain
decision criteria that do not satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern’s postulates
and were so far considered as part of the realm of qualitative decision theory.
A version of the Maximin criterion will be presented. The Maximin criterion
has been proposed by A. Wald [20], in a different framework. The criterion
to be presented is a variation on this theme.
Assume the setX is finite andH contains all subsets ofX . Let the elements
of X be x0, . . . , xn−1. Let ǫ be a number that is positive and infinitesimally
close to zero and let our utility function u be the linear function defined by:
u(xi) = ǫ
n−i−1, for i = 0, . . . , n− 1. Notice that xi < xj iff i < j. The utility
of a mixture λxi + (1− λ)xj is λǫ
n−i−1 if xi < xj and ǫ
n−i−1 if xi ∼ xj .
Suppose i < j and i′ < j′. Then, λxi + (1− λ)xj < µxi′ + (1− µ)xj′ iff
xi < xi′ or xi ∼ xi′ and λ > µ. The decision maker therefore compares differ-
ent mixtures by comparing the worst possible outcomes and, if they are the
same, their respective probabilities. This is some form of Maximin criterion
and does not satisfy A2 or A3, but it has been considered a rational way
of deciding by many authors, and it is amenable to Expected Qualitative
Utility Maximization.
7 Postulates for nonstandard probabilities and
standard utilities
The postulates that characterize this first case are A1, A3 and the following
B2.
Definition 2 λ ∈]0, 1[ is negligible iff, for any p, q ∈ P , λ p+ (1− λ) q ∼ q.
The intuitive meaning of negligible is infinitesimally close to zero.
B2 p > q, λ not negligible ⇒ λp+ (1− λ)r > λq + (1− λ)r.
8 Postulates for standard probabilities and
nonstandard utilities
The postulates that characterize this second case are A1 and the following.
To formulate our independence property, it is best to set the following
definition.
Definition 3 We shall say that p overrides q and write p≫ q iff p > q and
for any q′ such that q > q′ and for any λ ∈]0, 1[, λq + (1− λ)p ∼ λq′ + (1− λ)p.
The intuitive meaning of p≫ q is that p is so much preferred to q that, in
any lottery in which p and q are the prizes, if one does not win p, one does
not even care to cash q, but would as well get any lesser prize q′. Notice
that, since > is asymmetric, the relation≫ is also asymmetric and therefore
irreflexive.
Our independence property may now be formulated as:
A′2 p > q, r 6≫ p ⇒ ∀λ ∈]0, 1[ λp+ (1− λ)r > λq + (1− λ)r.
The intuitive meaning ofA’2 is that any lottery is sensitive to both its prizes,
unless one of the prizes overrides the other one.
A′3 p > q > r ⇒ ∃α ∈]0, 1[ such that αp+ (1− α)r > q.
A′′3 p > q > r, p 6≫ q ⇒ ∃β ∈]0, 1[ such that q > βp+ (1− β)r.
9 Comparison with previous work
Numerous works during the fifties and the sixties considered weakenings of
the von Neumann-Morgenstern’s postulates. Nonstandard analysis [15] ap-
peared late on the scene. This work proposes an original weakening based
on nonstandard analysis.
Our postulates are very close to the original postulates of von Neumann
and Morgenstern. In particular the ordering < is modular (weak total)
and the indifference relation ∼ is transitive. In the case of nonstandard
utilities, we weaken both A2 and A3, in a closely linked manner. Notice
that A2, A’3 and A”3 together imply A3, since A2 says that p≫ q im-
plies that for any w, w ≥ q. The lexicographic orderings of [3] provide one
of the best known weakenings of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s postu-
lates. The weakening they present is essentially orthogonal to ours. In-
deed, the lexicographic orderings define a preference relation that satisfies
A2. Any ordering that satisfies our postulates and those of von Neumann-
Morgenstern postulates. To explain better the difference between lexico-
graphic orderings and our qualitative ordering (in the case probabilities are
standard), assume P is the real plane R2 ordered by the lexicographic or-
dering: (x, y) < (x′, y′) iff either x < x′ or x = x′ and y < y′. For λ ∈ [0, 1],
define λ(x, y) + (1− λ)(x′, y′) to be (λx+ (1− λ)x′, λy + (1− λ)y′). Notice
that (0, 0) < (1, 10) < (2, 0), but there is no λ ∈]0, 1[ such that (1, 10) =
λ(0, 0) + (1− λ)(2, 0) since λ(0, 0) + (1− λ)(2, 0) = (2(1− λ), 0). Both lex-
icographic and qualitative orderings imply the failure of property P of sec-
tion 3. But lexicographic orderings also implies the failure of the follow-
ing property that holds in the case probabilities are standard: if p > q > r
and there exists some β ∈]0, 1[ such that q > βp+ (1− β)r, then there exists
some γ ∈]0, 1[ such that q ∼ γp + (1− γ)r. Indeed there exists some β ∈]0, 1[
such that (1, 10) >β(2, 0) + (1− β)(0, 0) = β(2, 0): for example β = 0.4, and
nevertheless there is no λ as above. Lexicographic and qualitative orderings
stem from different concerns and have very different characteristics.
10 Subjective probability
10.1 Anscombe-Aumann’s framework
In [1], Anscombe and Aumann consider a finite set S (of states) and the set
F (of acts) of mappings: S 7→ P . They show that a single postulate , added
to A1, A2 and A3 is enough to characterize the orderings obtainable from
subjective probabilities on states and linear utilities: for any a, b ∈ F,
A4 If ∀s ∈ S, s 6= s0 ⇒ a(s) = b(s), then a > b ⇒ a(s0) > b(s0).
In the last part of A4, a(s0) and b(s0) stand for the corresponding constant
functions.
For the case of standard utilities (and nonstandard probabilities), the same
single added postulate is enough to guarantee the corresponding result: ex-
istence of nonstandard subjective probabilities and a pseudo-linear utility
function into the standard reals.
For the case of standard probabilities (and nonstandard utilities), in addi-
tion to A1, A’2, A’3, A”3 and A4, one needs an additional postulate to
ensure the subjective probabilities are standard. This postulate deals with
Savage-null states.
A′5 t ∈ S, a ∈ F, a(t)≫ a ⇒ t is null.
where null is defined below and ≫ is defined in Definition 3.
Definition 4 Let t ∈ S. The element t is said to be null iff for any a, b ∈ F
we have a ∼ b if a and b agree everywhere except possibly on t, i.e., for any
s 6= t, a(s) = b(s).
11 Conclusion
Nonstandard models of the real numbers provide for a natural notion of
qualitative equivalence and a principle of Qualitative Utility Maximization.
This work characterizes in full the situation in which one allows nonstandard
utilities but insists on standard probabilities. In this framework one may
consider consequences that are infinitely preferable to others and criteria of
the Maximin family. The study of games with nonstandard utilities seems
appealing. The dual case of nonstandard probabilities and standard utilities
and the most general case of nonstandard probabilities and utilities are yet to
be characterized. They will include consideration of subjective probabilities
infinitesimally close to zero.
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